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COMMENTS
Proximate Cause In Louisiana
The term "proximate cause" has been given many and varied
definitions in the jurisprudence. In one case the court has said
that proximate cause is "'that which immediately precedes and
produces the effect, as distiguished from remote, mediate, or
predisposing cause'."' On another occasion, proximate cause
was defined as "efficient cause - the cause that sets other acts
in motion that produces the accident without an intervening and
independent agency."'2 In another instance the court remarked
that it was no defense "that the particular injurious conse-
quence was unforeseen, improbable, and not to have been rea-
sonably expected so long as it was the natural consequence of
1. Cruze v. Harvey & Jones, 134 So. 730, 731-32 (La. App. 1931).
2. Allen v. Louisiana Creamery Inc., 184 So. 395, 397 (La. App. 1938).
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the negligence of defendant's servant."' 3 One case has held that to
be the proximate cause the original act of negligence alleged must
be so "inextricably interwoven with the subsequent occurrences
involved that it cannot be disassociated from any of them."4
The court has further stated that "a person is answerable for
the consequences of his negligence only so far as they are the
natural and proximate results of the injury, and might have
been anticipated by ordinary forecast and not for those conse-
quences arising from a conjunction of his faults with circum-
stances of an extaordinary nature." 5
These statements are but a few of a variety of definitions or
"formulae" for proximate cause found in the Louisiana deci-
sions. As will be hereafter seen, these formulae are vague and
general expressions used by the court in deciding the issue of
proximate cause. Various reasons require this generality in the
wording of formulae. First, the considerations which influence
the courts in their decisions are often difficult to articulate.
Second, the factors which underlie the decisions are often policy
matters which courts are reluctant to use as an announced basis
of decision. The use of legal-sounding terminology is more ac-
ceptable. Moreover, in phrasing their decisions the courts are
moved by a desire to adhere to reason and the established deci-
sions. In many instances, as will be hereafter noted, a particular
formula may roughly approximate just what the court had in
mind in making its decisions. This is not always true, however.
Even if the decisions contained only one formula for prox-
imate cause, instead of many, the law would be little improved.
There are no reliable criteria for determining whether an act
is an "efficient cause" or a "remote cause," or whether a certain
injury is "foreseeable" or "unforeseeable." An attempt to apply
one formula would require still other formulae to interpret the
one at hand.
Since, at best, the formula for proximate cause in any par-
ticular case only roughly approximates the actual issues involved,
it is evident that formulae cannot serve as guides to, or criteria
for, the determination of the issue in other cases. Thus the
3. Atkins v. Bush, 141 La. 180, 188, 74 So. 897, 899 (1917).
4. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513, 519 (La. App. 1948), affd, 41 So.2d 692
(La. App. 1949).
5. Moore v. The Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 4:3 La. Ann. 792, 797, 9 So.
433, 434 (1891), citing WEEKS, DAMNuM ABSQUE INJURIA 230, § 115 (1879).
[Vol. XVI
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problem is one of establishing the dependable criteria for the
determination of the issue of proximate cause.
Scope and Meaning
In all negligence cases, plaintiff must establish that defend-
ant was a wrongdoer, and that this wrongdoing was in fact a
cause of his injury. Moreover, it is not sufficient that defend-
ant's negligence was in fact a cause of plaintiff's injury; in ad-
dition, it must also be the "legal" or "proximate" cause.
The issue of cause in fact can usually be answered by in-
quiring whether or not the accident would have occurred irre-
spective of defendant's wrongdoing.6 Thus the negligence of a
train engineer in failing to blow the train whistle to warn an
approaching motorist was not a cause in fact of plaintiff's in-
jury when the latter's own automobile made so much noise that
he could not have heard the whistle had defendant blown it.T
Similarly, the negligence of a defendant who parked a car on a
street facing in an unauthorized direction was not the cause in
fact of plaintiff's injury when the accident would have occurred
even had the vehicle been properly parked. s In each of these
cases, there was clearly no cause in fact between defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's injury. This is the proper scope of the
cause in fact issue.
9
In cases where the question of proximate cause is found,
defendant's conduct usually will clearly be the cause in fact as
determined above.10 The inquiry of proximate cause concerns
itself with the possibility that despite the causal relationship,
6. The typical expression of this rule is that "consequences are in fact causal
if they would not have happened but for the defendant's conduct. If the acts of
the defendant were necessary antecedents of the consequence in question, they
are a cause in fact of those consequences. This has become known as the 'but for'
or sine qua non rule." Arnold v. Griffith, 192 So. 761, 763 (La. App. 1939),
citing HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 253, § 109 (1933). This rule,
however, is ordinarily not applicable to cases in which defendant's negligence
has created a moving force. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 432(2) (1934).
7. Lockhart v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 153 So. 577 (La. App. 1934).
8. Painter v. Bewley Furniture Co., 195 So. 70 (La. App. 1940).
9. Defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause in fact of plaintiff's in-
jury. As illustrated in the case of Giardina v. Massaro and Patarno, 3 La. App.
221 (1925), separate acts of negligence may, by unfortunate circumstances, com-
bine to produce an injury. In such cases, the court may be willing to hold that
the negligence of each tortfeasor was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and
accordingly enter a judgment in solido against them. For an explanation of joint
tortfeasor and multiple cause in fact cases, see Russo v. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La.
App. 1942).
10. In Arnold v. Griffith, 192 So. 761, 763 (La. App. 1939), the court ob-
served that "there can be no legal or proximate cause unless there is a causal
connection in fact."
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the court may nevertheless feel that sound policy dictates a de-
nial of recovery.
It should be noted, however, that courts often use the terms
cause in fact and proximate cause interchangeably. 1 In addition,
the issue of proximate cause is often interjected into the case
when the only serious inquiry is whether defendant is guilty of
negligence. 12
The Problem
The consequences that follow a negligent act may continue
indefinitely in one form or another. It may be that good morals
would require that he who commits a wrongful act should be
answerable for all the losses which flow from that act, however
remote. Any attempt to impose liability on such a basis, how-
ever, would result in almost infinite liability for wrongful acts,
and in the words of one court "would set society on edge, and
fill the courts with endless litigation.' 8  As a matter of policy,
therefore, liability cannot be imposed indiscriminately for all
consequences that follow a wrongdoing. Thus, even in situations
where it is conceded that defendant is a wrongdoer and that his
wrongdoing was in fact a cause in bringing about the injury suf-
fered by plaintiff, the court may nevertheless feel that sound
policy dictates a denial of recovery.
Law protects numerous interests 14 of an individual. Typical
among these are the interests in one's person and property. This
11. In the following cases the court spoke in terms of proximate cause when
it probably had reference to cause in fact: Williams v. Pelican Creamery, Inc.,
30 So.2d 574 (La. App. 1947) ; Bodin v. Texas Co., 186 So. 390 (La. App. 1939) ;
Allen v. Louisiana Creamery Inc., 184 So. 395 (La. App. 1938) ; Hataway v. F.
Strauss & Son, Inc., 158 So. 408 (La. App. 1935) ; Lockhart v. Missouri Pacific
Ry., 153 So. 577 (La. App. 1934).
12. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 158 La. 763,
104 So. 707 (1925) ; Martinez v. Bernhard, 106 La. 368, 30 So. 901 (1901) ;
Sherman v. Parish of Vermilion, 51 La. Ann. 880, 25 So. 538 (1899) ; New Or-
leans & N.E.R.R. v. McEwen & Murray, 49 La. Ann. 1184, 22 So. 675 (1897) ;
Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Clarke Garage, 6 La. App. 420 (1927). In these
cases, the court spoke in terms of proximate cause although it appears that the
question was probably whether defendant was engaged in conduct which was un-
reasonable and hence negligent. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
78, 81-84 (1927).
13. North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 245, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).
14. "Interest" has been defined as "a claim or want or desire of a human
being or group of human beings which the human being . . .seeks to satisfy, and
of which, therefore, the ordering of human relations in civilized society must take
account." POUND, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TiE LAW OF TORTS 86 (1924) ; Note, 28
HARV. L. REv. 343, 345 (1924). See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
5-11 (1927) ; GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, C. 1 (1930) ; PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
12-14 (2d ed. 1955).
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legal protection is afforded by numerous rules of law which
impose certain standards of conduct to which individuals are
expected to conform. Plaintiff always comes into court relying
upon a certain rule or rules which he claims defendant has
violated. Sometimes the rule of law on which plaintiff relies
is a statute prohibiting a particular act or class of acts. In such
cases, it is well settled that the violation of a statute will not
give rise to civil liability unless the type of accident which befell
the plaintiff was a type against which the legislature intended to
afford protection.'0 Thus a statute which prohibits the employ-
ment of minors in occupations exposing them to noxious chem-
icals does not protect against the risk of injury to a minor by a
fall through a roof. 10 In determining this, the court usually in-
dicates that it is interpreting legislative intent. Frequently,
however, it is impossible to know what the legislature had in
mind by enacting a particular statute. As a consequence, in such
instances the courts are obliged to resort to their own judgment
to determine the extent of protection intended by the legislature.
Where the rule of law on which plaintiff relies is not statu-
tory, the process is nevertheless basically the same. In such
cases, though the court does not have the aid of "legislative in-
tent," it still must determine whether the risk plaintiff has en-
countered is within the ambit of protection of the rule of law
which forms the basis of his cause of action. Although in gen-
eral terms it may be said that plaintiff is relying on the "neg-
ligence" of defendant for recovery, plaintiff will in fact present
some specific particular in which he claims defendant was neg-
ligent. Thus a plaintiff injured by a train may rely upon de-
fendant's violation of the particular rule of law that the engineer
must keep a proper lookout, or that the engine must be equipped
with an adequate spark arrestor, or that the train must be run
at a reasonable rate of speed. "Negligence" is merely the ag-
gregate description of an infinite variety of such rules com-
prising what is commonly called the law of negligence.
The violation of rules of law may in fact subject the interest
15. See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Cutrer v. Southdown Sugars Inc., 42 So.2d 314 (La. App. 1949). Other
cases of this type are Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. 1005, 38 So. 810 (1905) (statute
prohibiting leaving carts unhitched to draft animals in the streets held not in-
tended to protect children from injury from playing on the carts) ; Cropper v.
Mills, 27 So.2d 764 (La. App. 1946) (statute prohibiting employment of boys
under sixteen on any night except Saturday held not intended to protect against
personal injury).
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of others to a great variety of risks.1 7 Thus the interest in one's
person may be endangered by such risks as a defective safety
device on a fallen electric wire,' a descending fire escape,' 9 the
explosion of blasting caps concealed in a trash can,20 the explo-
sion of an unknown mixture of gasoline and kerosene,21 or a
pistol shot from a dazed accident victim.2 2 Since the law never
gives absolute protection to any interest, recovery will be al-
lowed only if the rule of law on which plaintiff relies includes
within its limits protection against the particular risk that
plaintiff's interests encountered. This determination of the par-
ticular risks to plaintiff that fall within the ambit of protection
of the rule of law on which plaintiff relies is the determination
of the issue of proximate cause.
An example of the nature of this process is illustrated by
Davis v. H. B. Loeb Piano Co. 23 In that case, plaintiff's daughter
leaned against and fell through a window screen which had been
negligently replaced by defendant's employee while making re-
pairs. The question presented to the court was whether the risk
of a person falling through a window was included within the
scope of protection afforded by the rule of law requiring rea-
sonable care in replacing window screens. Finding for defend-
ant, the court concluded that the notion of a person falling out
of a window does not suggest itself as the type of harm to re-
sult from a loose window screen, particularly since a fall through
a window is not easily associated with a loose screen. The court
thought aloud along these lines and remarked that "a screen is
ordinarily used for the purpose of keeping out insects, and not
as a means of support. '2 4 Perhaps the decision would have been
17. The term "risk" is used to describe roughly the kind of danger to which
plantiff's interest is exposed. Thus plaintiff's house may be destroyed by fire
from encountering the risk of flying sparks emitted from a passing train. The
interest of the houscowner that has been invaded is his interest in property.
Suppose that while the house was burning the flames reached a box of pistol
cartridges in a closet causing an explosion wounding the next-door neighbor seated
in his own house a few yards away. The neighbor's invaded interest would be
his interest in his person. The risk the neighbor's interest has encountered was
the explosion of the burning box of cartridges. In this hypothetical situation,
the single violation of one rule of law has caused two risks, one of which invaded
the property interest of the houseowner, and the other the interest in person of the
neighbor.
18. Ledet v. Lockport Power & Light Co., 15 La. App. 426, 132 So. 272
(1931).
19. Blanks v. Saeuger Theaters Inc., 19 La. App. 305, 138 So. 883 (1931).
20. Varnado v. State, 136 So. 771 (La. App. 1931).
21. Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1945).
22. Lynch v. Fisher, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 1949).
23. 119 So. 746 (La. App. 1929).
24. Id. at 747.
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different had the screen fallen from its support to injure a
passerby below. Faced with the problem of explaining its posi-
tion, the court resorted to the language of proximate cause and
stated that the injury could not have been "reasonably foreseen
as a direct or probable consequence of the [defendant's] act. ' 25
Through the use of the term "foreseeable" in its formula, the
court has given a rough expression to the idea that underlay its
decision. The risk involved was not readily associated with the
rule of law invoked and for this reason was found to be outside
the scope of the rule's protection.
The assumption cannot be made, however, that obvious risks
easily associated with the rule of law on which plaintiff relies
are always within the realm of protection. In Cappel v. Pierson26
defendant was superintendent of the state insane asylum, in
the custody of which was placed one Smith, an inmate known
to be suffering from paranoia, a mental disease which caused
Smith to have a persistent desire to take human life. Immedi-
ately upon defendant's negligent release of Smith from the
asylum, the latter killed plaintiff's husband. Since it is to be
expected that Smith would kill if given the opportunity, the risk
of homicide is obviously easily associated with the rule of law
requiring a superintendent to use reasonable care before releas-
ing a dangerous paranoid. The court, however, rendered judg-
ment for defendant, thus determining that the risk of homicide
was not within the ambit of protection afforded by the rule of
law on which plaintiff relied.
In determining whether the risk of homicide was included
within the protection of this rule, the court was probably in-
fluenced by several considerations. The function performed by
mental institutions to society is important. Mental institutions
do not create a danger to society, but, on the contrary, attempt
to remove from society those who are already mentally ill. As
compared with some other activities later to be noted, the court
has demonstrated a tendency to be more lenient toward those
who merely undertake to protect against a peril which was not
of their own making. Further, the superintendent's negligence
consisted of his exercise of poor judgment in the performance
of a discretionary act. The practice of imposing personal lia-
bility on public officials in such instances might result in the
25. Ibid.
26. 15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391 (1931).
1956] 397
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
ultra-conservative administration of public duties, or the dis-
couragement of responsible men from serving in public office
for fear of ruinous liability for mistakes. The court, couching
its decision in part in the flexible language of proximate cause, 27
concluded in effect that on a basis of sound public policy the
risk of homicide was not included within the scope of the pro-
tection of the rule on which plaintiff relied. 28
In reality there are many considerations of judicial policy
which influence the court in its determination of the issue of
proximate cause. Ease of association is merely one of this group
of many. In any given case, one or more considerations may be
present. Some of these considerations may influence the court to
protect against the risk, while other considerations may tend to
induce the court to exclude the risk from the ambit of protection
of the rule on which plaintiff relies. The function of the court,
therefore, is one of weighing the respective considerations to
reach a decision. In the aggregate, these considerations of ju-
dicial policy are the only dependable criteria for the determina-
tion of the issue of proximate cause.
The Considerations of Judicial PolicyO
Ease of association. As indicated in the discussion of Davis
v. H. B. Loeb Piano Co., the notion that a risk does not readily
27. Id. at 526, 132 So. at 392. The language used by the court was "the de-
fendants could not, by the exercise of ordinary care and caution, have anticipated,
foreseen, or expected that the death of the plaintiff's intestate would follow as
the natural result of their act in discharging [Smith] from the hospital." Inas-
much as the risk was actually of the kind to be expected, one may doubt the
accuracy of the court's observation.
28. The weight of authority is probably in accord with this view. Henderson
v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897) (plaintiff raped by convict
who was negligently permitted to escape from prison labor gang) ; Bollinger v.
Rader, 151 N.C. 383, 66 S.E. 314 (1909) (patient negligently released from
state insane asylum killed young girl six months later). But cf. Austin W. Jones
& Co. v. Maine, 122 Maine 214, 119 Atl. 577 (1923) (plaintiff's property burned
by patient who was negligently released from state asylum) ; Williams v. State,
204 Misc. 843, 126 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. N.Y.) affd, 284 App. Div. 1027, 134
N.Y.S.2d 857 (4th Dep't 1953) (plaintiff died from brain hemorrhage brought
on by fright occasioned when convict, who was negligently permitted to escape,
forced plaintiff to aid him); Weeks v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S.2d
542 (3d Dep't 1943) (plaintiff stabbed by patient who was negligently permitted
to escape from insane asylum).
29. Case illustrations are hereafter given for the various considerations of
judicial policy discussed. Though several considerations may be presented in a cited
case, for purposes of emphasis, mention is made only of the operation of the par-
ticular consideration under discussion. The interaction of various considerations
in a single case is illustrated on page 409 infra.
It is to be noted that in Louisiana the jury is of no significance in civil cases.
Louisiana appellate courts are triers of both fact and law and for this reason the
use of jury trials in civil cases is for all practical purposes non-existent.
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suggest itself as the type against which the rule of law would
seem to protect is an inducement for the court to deny recovery.
Conversely, when risks are easily associated with the rule of law
upon which plaintiff relies, this induces the court to allow re-
covery. Thus if restaurant co-owners were to engage in fight-
ing in the presence of customers, there would be a strong ten-
dency for the court to allow recovery for the unintentional in-
jury of a patron. 0 Similarly, a pharmacist who negligently com-
pounds a prescription is liable when the patient dies from its
effects,31 and an electric company that negligently permits elec-
tricity to flow through a fallen line is liable when a child comes
in contact with it and is electrocuted.8 2 In these types of cases,
courts are likely to use the formula that "negligence is the
proximate cause of injury which, under the circumstances, is
foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of such
negligence." In a large number of cases, the association is so
easily made that the proximate cause issue is not seriously con-
sidered by the courts. The ordinary traffic collision is a typical
example.
The presence of causes intervening subsequent to defend-
ant's act which brings about injury presents no special problem.
In such cases, the inquiry of the court is simply whether the
risk produced by the combination of defendant's act and the
intervening cause is one which is within the scope of protection
of the rule of law upon which plaintiff relies. Thus the rule
requiring a pilot to take reasonable precautions to secure his
aircraft when warned of an approaching storm includes within
the ambit of its protection the risk of wind blowing the plane
into another craft 23 Similarly, an electric company that main-
tains a rotten line pole is liable when an ordinary wind causes
30. Matranga v. Travelers Insurance Co., 55 So.2d 633 (La. App. 1951).
31. McCubbin v. Hasting, 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875).
32. Lasyone v. Zenoria Lumber Co., 163 La. 185, 111 So. 670 (1927) (tenant's
child killed by falling against a nail which landlord had negligently permitted to
protrude from the wall); Claussen v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
126 La. 1087, 53 So. 357 (1910) (plaintiff injured by electric wires negligently
left across a road while attempting to free his tangled wagon) ; Gibbs v. Tourres,
50 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1951) (plaintiff's truck damaged when rotten limb fell) ;
Harding v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 188 So. 177 (La. App. 1939) (ap-
plicant's beneficiary suffered loss of value of life insurance policy when in-
surance company negligently failed to notify applicant whether application was
accepted or rejected and applicant died in the interim) ; Ledet v. Lockport Power
& Light Co., 15 La. App. 426, 132 So. 272 (1931) ; Hatcher v. Burlett, 119 So.
748 (La. App. 1929) (mule negligently permitted to run away forced auto into
pedestrian).
33. Southern Air Transport v. Gulf Airways, Inc., 215 La. 366, 40 So.2d 787
(1949).
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the pole to fall upon a pedestrian.34 By the same token, a theater
that negligently maintains a descending fire escape over a side-
walk is liable when a small boy rides it down from the balcony
exit and injures a pedestrian.35 In cases of this kind, the courts
ordinarily use the "foreseeability" formula previously mentioned,
and indicate that "foreseeable intervening forces do not super-
sede defendant's negligence."
Conversely, when risks produced by the combination of an
intervening cause with defendant's negligence are of a type not
easily associated with the rule of law upon which plaintiff re-
lies, there is an inducement for the court to exclude the risk
from the scope of protection of the rule and to deny that de-
fendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Ac-
cordingly, a suicide-bent defendant who negligently fires a pistol
and causes plaintiff to flee the room is not liable when plaintiff
is mistakenly shot by policemen as a result of the confusion.3 6
In this type of case, the courts usually use the "foreseeability"
formula and add that "unforeseeable intervening causes super-
sede defendant's negligence."
If the kind of injury is readily associated with the rule of law
upon which plaintiff relies, the court is often constrained to
permit recovery even though the particular means by which the
injury was inflicted is unusual in nature. A classic case is
Stumpf v. Baronne Building,3 7 in which the owner of an office
building was held liable for maintaining and operating an ele-
vator that was not equipped with a collapsible door. As the
elevator moved in the shaft, numerous projections from the shaft
wall threatened any passenger whose person was beyond the
limits of the car. As the elevator descended plaintiff slipped
34. Joseph v. Edison Electric Co., 104 La. 634, 29 So. 223 (1901).
35. Fletcher v. Ludington Lumber Co., 142 La. 151, 76 So. 592 (1917)
(lumber company negligently placed skidder cable behind working loggers; cable
obstructed plaintiff's path of escape when limb fell from tree and plaintiff in-
jured) ; Blanks v. Saenger Theaters Inc., 19 La. App. 305, 138 So. 883 (1931) ;
Finney v. Banner Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 13 La. App. 101, 126 So. 573 (1930)
(defendant's employee negligently opened door leading to alley; plaintiff knocked
into the path of an oncoming truck and injured) ; Hart v. Town of Lake Provi-
dence, 5 La. App. 294 (1926) (municipality negligently permitted rotten limb to
remain for more than a year in dangerous proximity to electric wires suspended
below; wind of ordinary force caused limb to fall on wires, thus pulling line
pole down on plaintiff) ; Holden v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co. and the
Sewerage & Waterboard of the City of New Orleans, 1 La. App. 521 (1925)
(highway construction crew displayed warning lanterns; storm blew lights out
and plaintiff injured when auto crashed into excavation).
36. Perez v. Carbrey, 22 So.2d 76 (La. App. 1945).
37. 16 La. App. 702, 135 So. 100 (1931).
[Vol. XVI
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in his attempt to avoid being burned by a negligently ignited
box of matches being thrown about the car and fell so that his
hand was crushed by a projection from the shaft wall. 8  In such
cases the courts are likely to remark that "negligence is the
proximate cause of injury when under the circumstances the
type of injury is foreseeable, even though the manner in which
it is brought about is unforeseeable."
Moral considerations. Courts are conscious of the fact that
all who may be said to be negligent are not necessarily guilty
of the same degree of wrongdoing. The courts appear to be
moved by an instinctive feeling that liability should be com-
mensurate with the caliber of defendant's culpability. 9 This
tendency is best illustrated in cases where an intentional wrong-
doer is held fully responsible for the consequences of his wrong-
doing under the doctrine of transferred intent.40 By the same
token, it is unlikely that defendant will be held for extraordinary
consequences of his act when, although technically negligent, he
is not guilty of conduct which from a moral standpoint is basi-
cally reprehensible. A more subtle aspect of this tendency may
lead courts to feel that overt and active negligent conduct is more
38. Similar cases of this type are: Hughes v. Southwestern Gas & Electric
Co., 175 La. 336, 143 So. 281 (1932) (public utility held for fire caused when
negligently driven wagon struck guy wire); Thompson v. Commercial National
Bank, 156 La. 479, 100 So. 688 (1924) (building owners liable for awning sup-
port falling on pedestrian when awning caught fire from unknown cause) ; Lee
v. Powell Bros. & Sanders Co., 126 La. 51, 52 So. 214 (1910) (steam lever of log
carriage negligently left unlocked; plaintiff crushed when the lever engaged due
to unknown cause) ; Payne v. Georgetown Lumber Co., 117 La. 983, 42 So. 475
(1906) (lumber company negligently maintained unsafe latch on steam lever
operating lumber carriage; plaintiff crushed when thrown shovel bounced un-
expectedly and knocked latch out) ; Edelman v. Refrigeration Co., 72 So.2d 627
(La. App. 1954) (installment of heating-air conditioning unit in improperly
ventilated equipment room caused formation of carbon monoxide gas; plaintiff
asphixiated when fumes were carried to her bedroom due to a section of trans-
mission duct broken by negligence of another); Mason v. Herrin Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 168 So. 331 (La. App. 1936) (heavy chain was negligently
wedged against overhead construction; worker lifted other end of rafter and chain
fell on plaintiff) ; Theodore v. J. G. McCrory Co., 137 So. 352 (La. App. 1931)
(splinter from negligently maintained store floor entered plaintiff's foot through
hole in his shoe).
39. Perhaps this is illustrated in the recent case of Preuett v. State, 62 So.2d
686 (La. App. 1953), in which a state highway department construction crew's
negligent repair of the section of a bridge resulted in liability when travel over
the bad section was so rough that plaintiff was thrown from the truck in such a
manner that her foot was caught in the door, dragging her for some distance
before the foot was dislodged, whereupon she was run over by the rear wheel.
In modern times when great numbers of vehicles travel the roads at high speeds,
it is a serious thing to obstruct or in any manner impair the safety of the high-
ways. The court's willingness to hold the state for such attenuated consequences
as these may have been prompted by the serious moral reprehensibility of de-
fendant's act.
40. See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 33-34 (2d ed. 1955).
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morally reprehensible than mere passive failure to exercise the
required care.
Similarly, the intervening act of a third person may be so
morally reprehensible that the court will be constrained to feel
that the simple negligence of defendant does not warrant the
imposition of liability. Thus the carelessness of an automobile
driver who leaves his keys in the car,41 or leaves his motor
running,42 is not sufficiently serious to warrant recovery against
the vehicle owner when a mature person deliberately steals the
vehicle and injures life or damages property in the escape. 43 In
such cases, the disparity in the extent of wrongdoing prompts
the court to place sole responsibility on the more blameworthy
of the two. The courts are likely to indicate in such situations
that the act of the third person was "unforeseeable and thus
superseded defendant's negligence."
Though the courts are inclined to be lenient toward defend-
ants whose wrongdoing is augmented by the intervening act of
a third person, this is usually not true in situations where the
act of the third person consists only in his failure to remove the
peril defendant has created. Thus, when a gas company negli-
gently fails to repair a leak in its pipeline, the unsuccessful at-
tempt of a third person to remove the danger by placing upright
a seven-foot pipe to carry away the escaping gas will not relieve
the gas company of liability when a child is later burned. 4" In
41. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951).
42. Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933).
43. Other cases of this type are: Moore v. Jefferson Distilling & Denaturing
Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930) (shipper of steel drums negligently per-
mitted alcohol to remain in drums; plaintiff injured when third party with
knowledge of the presence of the dangerous fumes stuck lighted match into the
bung hole) ; Petrich v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Association, 188
So. 199 (La. App. 1939) (golf instructor negligently placed pupil near fairway;
pupil injured when third party golfer negligently drove his ball without calling
"fore").
In some cases, due to the counterbalancing influence of other considerations,
a different result is reached. Thus in Japhet & Co. v. Southern Ry., 8 La. App.
706 (1927), plaintiff's freight was destroyed by fire when the railroad negligently
left its cars exposed to a race riot. See n. 68 infra.
Similarly, in Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So.2d 729 (1953), a contractor
who left an unenclosed and unguarded stack of lumber on the school playground
was held liable when a seven-year old pupil was injured from an intentional push
given by a classmate. See page 403 infra.
44. Jackson v. Texas Co., 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137 (1918) ; Cornell v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 8 So.2d 364 (La. App. 1942) (nurse negligently
prepared incubator for the arrival of baby; doctor failed to check personally the
incubator and baby received third degree burns) ; Varnado v. State, 136 So. 771
(La. App. 1931) (defendant negligently placed blasting caps in waste basket in
defendant's store; third person told of the act failed to inform store owner who
was later injured while burning the trash). But c. Pittsburg Reduction Co. v.
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such cases, the courts are likely to indicate that the intervening
act of the third person was a "foreseeable intervening cause
which does not supersede defendant's negligence."
Moral considerations may sometimes influence the court to
be reluctant to hold those who have undertaken to protect others
from a danger or evil which was not of their own making. In
Cappel v. Pierson,5 this was probably a considerable influence
on the court to deny recovery against the state insane asylum.
Courts prompted by moral considerations often manifest a
particular solicitude for certain classes of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
injured in their attempt to rescue others have been given legal
protection which would be difficult to justify under the circum-
stances in the absence of some special inclination to protect this
class of persons. 46 In one leading case, the court observed that
though the wrongdoer could not foresee the coming of the
rescuer, "he is accountable as if he had. '47 It is likely that in
these cases the courts feel that such regard for the welfare of
others should be rewarded and encouraged. Only when the
rescuer is rash or otherwise clearly imprudent under the circum-
stances will recovery be denied.4 8 In these cases the courts usually
base their decision on some landmark decision, 49 rather than on
a formula for proximate cause.
A solicitude for the welfare of children is another considera-
tion that apparently influences the courts. This attitude is per-
haps due to the fact that children cannot be under constant
parental supervision and are incapable of safeguarding adequate-
ly their own welfare. One feature of this willingness to permit
Horton, 87 Ark. 576, 113 S.W. 647 (1908) (defendant held not liable when
mother knowingly let child keep dynamite caps) ; Henningsen v. Markowitz, 182
Misc. 547, 230 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (defendant held not liable when
mother hid air rifle in closet but child found it).
45. See page 397 supra.
46. Peyton v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 41 La. Ann. 861, 6 So. 690 (1889) (plain-
tiff injured in attempt to rescue drunk from oncoming train). One court has
said, "we call attention to the fact that a rescuer is favored in the eyes of the
law"; Lynch v. Fisher, 41 So.2d 692, 695 (La. App. 1949) (plaintiff injured
in attempt to ,rescue accident victims from burning auto) ; see Davis v. Hoch-
felder, 153 La. 183, 95 So. 598 (1923) (mother injured in attempt to rescue son
from asphyxiation and drowning) ; Whitworth v. Shreveport Belt Ry., 112 La.
363, 36 So. 414 (1904) and Short v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., 36 So.2d
658 (La. App. 1948) (plaintiff injured in attempt to rescue a companion who
came into contact with electric wire).
47. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921).
48. Whitworth v. Shreveport Belt Ry., 112 La. 363, 36 So. 414 (1904).
49. A common practice is to cite Eckardt v. Long Island, 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am.
Rep. 721 (1871).
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children to recover for their injuries is that others will be en-
couraged to conduct their affairs in a manner not dangerous to
children. Thus, building contractors who have maintained an
unenclosed stack of lumber have been held liable for injuries to
children playing thereon due to falls caused from tripping,50 or
being intentionally pushed by a playmate. 51 The courts usually
apply the "foreseeability" formula in these cases and decide
that under the circumstances, "the injury was foreseeable as the
natural and probable consequence of defendant's negligent act."
Administrative considerations. The courts are concerned
with the practical effect that a decision may have on the course
of future litigation. They are well aware that a case once decided
may provide the basis on which attorneys may press for further
extensions of the law. This urge felt by courts to protect the
judicial machinery from future imposition is one of the most
conservative influences in the law.
Relatively speaking, some situations suggest extensions more
readily than others. This is particularly true of situations where
remoteness in time and space is involved. In such cases, counsel
for defendant are quick to call to the attention of the court the
dilemma it may encounter in future litigation should recovery be
allowed in the case at bar. In many instances judicial awareness
of these considerations may be dependent upon the ability of
counsel to effectively call the attention of the court to the quan-
dary which would result if judgment were to be given for the
plaintiff. This is illustrated in the case of Cruze v. Harvey &
JoneS5 2 in which a mule was killed in falling into an abandoned
well two miles from the pasture from which defendant permitted
it to escape. Mindful of the fact that recovery might invite fu-
ture litigation in which the courts may experience difficulty in
avoiding extensions of the protection of the rule to cover injuries
occurring even farther away and at an even later date, the court
expressly denied recovery on administrative grounds.5 3 In cases
50. Salter v. Zoder, 216 La. 769, 44 So.2d 862 (1950).
51. Palermo v. Orleans Ice Mfg. Co., 130 La. 833, 58 So. 589 (1912) (children
burned when manufacturing concern discharged scalding water into gutter located
near school) ; Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So.2d 729 (1953) ; Hunt v.
Rundle, 120 So. 696 (La. App. 1929) (child burned when playing with gasoline
left in accessible place by plumber).
52. 134 So. 730 (La. App. 1931).
53. Id. at 732. In a rare instance of literal expression of the influence of
administrative considerations, the court stated: "Could it be said that if plain-
tiff's mule has wandered into the city of Monroe [a distance of approximately
fifty miles] and been killed by congested traffic on DeSiard street, the defend-
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of this kind, the courts may state that the injury is not "fore-
seeable," or perhaps indicate that "proximate cause is that
which immediately precedes and produces the effect, as distin-
guished from a remote, mediate, or predisposing cause .... "
Although administrative considerations usually exert their
influence toward a denial that defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, yet in at least one class of
cases it seems likely that the same considerations may have
served to expand the scope of liability. Once it has been deter-
mined that defendant's wrong was the cause of plaintiff's injury,
courts are reluctant to accept the contention that plaintiff is less
entitled to recovery than a normal person merely because he was
peculiarly predisposed to injury for some special reason. Thus a
defendant is liable when his negligence operates on a concealed
physical condition such as a dormant,54 or active disease, 55 or the
susceptibility to disease or injury. 56 Similarly, a defendant is
liable for injury to a pregnant woman which produces mental
anguish,57 or a miscarriage. 58  In such cases the courts retreat
ant would be liable for its death? We think not. By the same process of reason-
ing we conclude that defendant cannot be held in damages for the death of the
mule caused by its falling in some unknown manner into an open, unprotected
well two miles away."
54. Roth v. Russell, 141 La. 581, 75 So. 418 (1917) (dormant enlarged
vertebrae "precipitated congenital malformation of the spine") ; Lapleine v. Mor-
gan's Louisiana & Texas R.R. & Steamship Co., 40 La. Ann. 661, 4 So. 875 (1888)
(lumber fell from defendant's truck and slightly injured child with latent heredi-
tary hysterical diathesis which caused child to later become a constant invalid
with seriously affected mind and nervous system) ; Levy v. Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. North America, 8 So.2d 774 (La. App. 1942) (dormant dementia praecox
caused manic depressive psychosis) ; Peppers v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 198
So. 177 (La. App. 1940) (dormant colitis became active causing hemorrhages).
55. Shaffer v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 184 La. 158, 165
So. 651 (1936) ("certain" diseased bodily condition accelerated expected death) ;
Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 7 La. App. 534 (1928), reversed in
part on other grounds, 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1928) (existing arteriosclerosis
and high blood pressure produced death) ; Hall v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co.,
5 La. App. 6 (1925) (existing climacteria produced insanity). For cases concerning
the judicial attitude toward the acceleration of impending death, see Orgeron v.
Hourgettes, 67 So.2d 746 (La. App. 1953) ; Walker v. Geddes Funeral Service,
33 So.2d 570 (La. App. 1948).
56. Goins v. Moore, 143 So. 522 (La. App. 1932) (blow to old knee injury
produced complete ankylosis); Poncet v. South New Orleans Light & Traction
Co., 3 La. App. 64 (1925) (serious complications arising due to previous old
injury which made wrist susceptible to injury). No Louisiana cases are directly
in point on susceptibility to disease. See, however, Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. v.
Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 3 N.E. 389, 4 N.E. 908 (1885) ; Baltimore City Pass Ry. v.
Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1883).
57. Broughton v. T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, 200 La. 421, 8 So.2d 76 (1942)
(auto-truck collision) ; Favalora v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 143 La. 572,
78 So. 944 (1918) (train collision) ; Holzab v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R.,
38 La. Ann. 185 (1886) (train collision); Youman v. McConnell & McConnell
Inc., 7 La. App. 315 (1927) (truck pedestrian accident).
58. White v. Juge, 176 La. 1045, 147 So. 72 (1933); Thompson v. Cooke,
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from the prospect of continuously probing into the combination
of circumstances which are responsible for making a particular
injury unusually severe.
Economic considerations. Although courts consistently deny
that a distinction should be drawn between a wealthy defendant
and an impecunious one, there nevertheless seems to be a ten-
dency to impose more extensive liability where defendant is cov-
ered by insurance. This inclination is probably due to the fact
that recovery against insurance companies results in wide dis-
tribution of the losses in the form of increased premiums paid by
holders of similar policies. Thus the costs of risks attendant to
the operation of trains are absorbed by railroad insurance com-
panies whose increased premiums are paid for by railroad cus-
tomers in the form of higher freight rates and passenger fares.
Perhaps this accounts for the growing tendency to impose lia-
bility on insured motorists, public carriers, public utilities, and
similar activities for consequences which the uninsured indiv-
idual would not be held liable.
Conversely, where defendant is a charitable institution, or an
enterpriser in some activity whose continued existence is vital to
society, economic considerations seem to prompt the court to deny
recovery altogether, or permit it only for those injuries readily
associated with defendant's wrong. In Cappel v. Pierson,59 these
considerations probably influenced the court in denying recovery
against the insane asylum for the criminal misconduct of an in-
mate who was negligently allowed his freedom.60
The type of activity in which defendant engages. As a result
of the combination of various considerations, particularly moral
and economic ones, there appears to be some significance in the
147 La. 922, 86 So. 332 (1920) (fall from defective steps) ; Joiner v. Texas &
Pacific Ry., 128 La. 1050, 55 So. 670 (1911) (train accident) ; Stewart v.
Arkansas So. Ry., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904) (shock and fright produced
when passenger coach became unhooked when train en route) ; Green v. Frederick,
141 So. 505 (La. App. 1932) (miscarriage of twins resulting from fall from
defective steps).
59. See page 397 supra.
60. The classic case on this aspect of the influence of economic considera-
tions is Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 211, 216-17T, 91 Am. Dec.
49 (1866), in which the court, hypothetically speaking of a negligently caused
fire in the house of A, stated: ". . . if, however, the fire communicates from the
house of A to that of B, and that is destroyed, is the negligent party liable for
his loss? And if it spreads thence to the house of C, and thence to the house of
D, and thence consecutively through the other houses until it reaches and con-
sumes the house of Z, is the party liable to pay the damages sustained by these
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type of activity in which a defendant is engaged. 6' By nature,
some activities are so highly dangerous that even after the exer-
cise of the utmost care, an irreducible amount of danger remains
to imperil society. Typical examples .are persons who deal with
electricity, or explosives such as gasoline, oil, gases, or dynamite.
An instinctive feeling of justice seems to indicate that those
who choose to engage in ultra-hazardous activities should bear
the responsibility for the losses which must inevitably result.
These activities are usually large-scale operations well suited to
insure adequately against losses, or to absorb them directly as a
cost of doing business. In either event, the customers whose de-
mands indirectly occasion the operation of the activity absorb
the losses in the form of increased prices for the service or prod-
uct. Although it is impossible to say definitely that the courts
maintain this attitude toward such activities, negligence has been
found in seemingly reasonable conduct, and liability has been
imposed for the most extraordinary consequences, under circum-
stances which would be difficult to justify in the absence of some
special tendency to impose liability.
Thus an electric company 62 which places a pole on the dam of
a pond is liable for plaintiff's electrocution when during unusual-
ly heavy rains a culvert becomes clogged and high water erodes
the dam so badly that the pole falls and exposes the high voltage
twenty-four sufferers? . . . To sustain such a claim as the present, and to follow
the same to its legitimate consequences would subject to a liability against which
no prudence could guard, and to meet which no private fortune would be ade-
quate. . . . To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but
that he must guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides, and to an
unlimited exent, would be to create a liability which would be the destruction of
all civilized society."
61. The defendants in tort cases are to a large extent public utilities, industrial
corporations, commercial enterprises, and automobile owners. A count of 94 Lou-
isiana cases bearing on the issue of proximate cause revealed the following list
of defendants: railway and street railway companies, 17; manufacturers and in-
dustrial concerns, 16; airplanes, trucks, buses and taxi owners, 12; electric and
telephone companies, 10; automobile owners, 7; gasoline and gas companies, 6;
others, 26.
62. Other cases involving electric companies are: Hughes v. Southwestern Gas
& Electric Co., 175 La. 336, 143 So. 281 (1932) (wires negligently strung too
close together; fire damage from short circuit caused when negligently driven
wagon struck guy wire) ; Joseph v. Edison Electric Co., 104 La. 634, 29 So. 223
(1901) (electric light company maintained rotten pole on public street at the
base of which local telephone company made an excavation weakening pole; high
wind broke pole which fell on a pedestrian) ; Wilson v. Great Southern Tele-
phone &,Telegraph Co., 41 La. Ann. 1041, 6 So. 781 (1889) (negligently placed
guy wire on street neutral ground; plaintiff fireman injured when he drove an
open cockpit fire truck onto neutral ground).
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wires.61 Similarly, a distributor of butane gas64 whose tank truck
explodes and burns following a collision is responsible for in-
jury to a spectator when the heat from the flames burns an
overhead wire which falls against plaintiff, knocking her into a
bridge.65
Even when the activity has become commonplace, such as the
operation of motor vehicles and trains, the availability of insur-
ance combined with the pressing social problem of automobile
and train accident victims perhaps induces the courts to deal
more severely with these activities than they otherwise would.
Thus a defendant motor vehicle6" owner who parks his car too
close to the vehicle in front is liable when in the driver of the
latter vehicle's attempt to pull away from the curb, defendant's
car motor starts, thereby propelling the automobile in reverse
down the street, across an intersection, and through the plate
63. Scott v. Claiborne Electric Co-op., 13 So.2d 524, 529 (La. App. 1943):
"We think that which did happen, in view of all of the facts and circumstances,
could have been, in legal contemplation, reasonably expected and anticipated."
64. Another case of this type which involves a distributor of gasoline is
Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1945) (defendant gasoline distributor
negligently placed gasoline in kerosene tank but warned retailer of this fact; plain-
tiff's entire family injured by the mixture purchased from retailer).
65. Chavers v. A. R. Blossman, Inc., 45 So.2d 398, 402 (La. App. 1950):
"The chain of circumstances from the collision to the igniting and burning of the
truck and electric line which fell across Mrs. Chavers' shoulder, was one con-
tinuous chain of unbroken circumstances."
In connection with this case, it is to be noted that the truck driver could
have foreseen no unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff. Perhaps in a sense
of words the language in the case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99 (1928) would seem to state a contrary view to the instant case. It is
likely that these cases are not diametrically opposed to one another. In the
Palsgraf decision, the negligence of the railroad employees in helping a passenger
on the train is probably not a severe moral wrong. In the instant case, however,
morality would seem to indicate that the dealer in explosives should bear the
losses occasioned by the use of his product.
Dean Green and Professor Goodhart have engaged in the same controversy
concerning the Palsgraf case and the case of Smith v. Lowdon & S.W. Ry., L.R.
6 C.P. 14 (1870). See GREEN, JUDGE AND JuRY 249-67 (1930).
66. Other cases involving motor vehicles are: Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513(La. App. 1948), aff'd, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 1949) (truck driver whose neg-
ligence caused accident held liable when dazed accident victim shot rescuer);
Arnold v. Griffith, 192 So. 761 (La. App. 1939) (negligent driver held liable for
all damage in an unusual four-car accident) ; Maggiore v. Laundry & Dry Clean-
ing Service Inc., 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933) (motorist blocked driveway; car
started and ran over plaintiff who attempted to move it) ; Vincent v. Tech Trans-
fer, 8 La. App. 323 (1928) (negligently driven auto forced another vehicle into
plaintiff's parked car); Welsch v. Standard Oil Co., 3 La. App. 734 (1926)
(negligently driven auto forced another vehicle into a pedestrian). But cf. Mid-
kiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951) ; Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, 148
So. 76 (La. App. 1933).
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glass window of plaintiff's store.07 Similarly, a railroad6s that
negligently burns weeds and grass off its right-of-way is liable
when wind-blown smoke envelops the nearby highway, causing
moving vehicles to collide and careen into plaintiff's parked car.69
In cases involving these activities, courts may employ a variety of
formulae to substantiate their position.70
The Interaction of the Considerations of Judicial Policy
As previously noted, in any given case one or more consid-
erations may influence the court's decision. Of these, some may
influence the court to include the risk within the protection of
the rule upon which plaintiff relies for recovery, while other con-
siderations may exercise greater or less influence that the risk be
excluded. The function of the court in the determination of the
issue of proximate cause is to weigh these influences to reach a
sound decision. One cannot know precisely which considerations
will dominate in any given controversy. The conclusion may de-
pend upon the personality of the judge, the drama of the con-
troversy, the availability of a forceful decision that seems to con-
trol the case, or other imponderables. 1
67. Weiss v. King, 151 So. 681 (La. App. 1934) : "Where, in the sequence of
events between the original default and the final mischief an entirely independent
and unrelated cause intervenes, and is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of
the mischief, the second cause is ordinarily regarded as the proximate cause and
the other as the remote cause." The court then determined that the intervening
act was not "entirely independent and unrelated."
68. It is not unlikely that one element of the tendency to impose liability on
railroads results from the inequality of position between the engineer in the cab
and the man on the tracks or the vehicle at the intersection. In such situations,
the train is well suited as a destructive force, but the engineer is in little danger.
Furthermore, by the exercise of the privilege of expropriation, a special favor
afforded by the Legislature, tracks may be laid through one's front yard, or
through a pine forest thus endangering life and property.
In its status as a common carrier, the contract of fare is an additional In-
fluence for the court to impose liability. Thompson v. New Orleans Railway &
Light Co., 148 La. 698, 87 So. 716 (1921) (defendant's conductor suggested
that passenger cross over a canal on a nearby railroad bridge to catch the trolley
waiting on the other side; train approached while plaintiff was crossing tracks,
she became confused and fell to her death).
Under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2754 (1870) common carriers are made near in-
surers of their freight. Under this article, only loss occasioned by "accidental and
uncontrollable events" will vitiate liability. It has long been held, however, that
even in these instances, such as loss by flood [National Rice Milling Co. v. New
Orleans & N.E.R.R., 132 La. 615, 61 So. 708 (1913)], or loss by mob violence
[Japhet & Co. v. Southern Ry., 8 La. App. 706 (1927)], the carriers will be
held legally responsible if negligently exposing the freight. Hunt v. Morris, 6
Mart.(O.S.) 676 (La. 1819) ; Perrin v. T. & P. Ry., 14 Orl. App. 376 (La. App.
1917).
69. Graham v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 54 So.2d 822, 826 (La. App. 1951).
The damages was held to be "reasonably foreseeable."
70. See notes 63, 65, 67, and 69, aupra.
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This weighing process may be observed in the classic case of
Lynch v. Fisher.1 In that case, defendant's truck was negligently
parked on the highway at night without lights, as a consequence
of which an automobile crashed into the rear of the truck and
caught fire with the driver and his wife trapped inside. Plain-
tiff, who lived nearby, rushed to the scene, and extricated both
the wife and the driver, the latter being mentally deranged from
the impact. Plaintiff found a loaded pistol in the burning auto-
mobile which he handed to the dazed driver, whereupon the latter
shot plaintiff in the ankle.
Plaintiff sought recovery for his gunshot wound against the
truck owner, relying upon the rule of law that motorists who
stop on highways at night must take reasonable precautions to
warn other motorists of their presence. Plaintiff's claim was
that the risk of an accident victim shooting a man who attempts
to aid the injured is within the ambit of protection afforded by
the rule. It was for the court to decide, and thus determine the
issue of proximate cause, whether such a risk was within the
protection of the rule. In the factual situation presented, the
following conflicting considerations would seem to influence the
court.
The risk of an accident victim shooting one seeking to aid
the injured does not readily suggest itself as the type of injury
against which a rule requiring motorists to take precautions to
warn others of their presence would protect. Ease of associa-
tion, therefore, would influence the court to exclude the risk from
the protection of the rule.
Administrative considerations would suggest that a verdict
for plaintiff might open the door to future claims to extend the
protection of the rule to cover absurd risks. The court might en-
vision attempts to extend this rule to cover a case in which a
collision causes the victim such extended pain and suffering that
he becomes despondent and commits suicide, 72 or injures a third
party. As a practical matter, the courts do not yet seem willing
to place full confidence in medical science to determine whether
a person is mentally deranged or not, or whether a given act is
the product of derangement. Fearful of a flood of groundless
71. 34 So.2d 513 (La. App. 1948), off d, 41 So.2d 692 (La. App. 1949), 9
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 421 (1949).
72. This exact factual situation was presented in the case of Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930), in which the court expressed
in its opinion that administrative considerations prompted the denial of recovery.
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litigation over mental cases, administrative considerations might
influence the court to exclude such a risk even from a case where
the reality of a party's mental derangement is not doubted.
Several moral considerations would operate to influence the
court to include the risk within the protection of the rule. De-
fendant has committed the dangerous act of obstructing a high-
way. This kind of conduct becomes more pernicious as the speed
of modern motor vehicles continuously increases. The degree of
defendant's moral culpability is great, and thus is a pronounced
influence on the court to trace defendant's responsibility to
extraordinary consequences. Furthermore, plaintiff is a rescuer,
and as such, morality urges that he should be rewarded and en-
couraged.
Economic considerations would probably influence the court
to include the risk within the protection of the rule. Truck own-
ers are ideally situated to provide insurance against the dangers
to which they subject society. The solvency of the insurance com-
pany is reached to satisfy plaintiff's claim, and the paid claim is
in turn reflected in the form of slightly increased premium rates
on truck insurance policies.
Closely allied with both moral and economic considerations,
the fact that the operation of motor vehicles is a dangerous activ-
ity is an influence on the court to impose liability even for the
most unusual consequences.
In the cited case, the court found that plaintiff should re-
cover. No serious mention was made of the considerations in-
fluencing the decision. In typical style, the opinion was cast in
the familiar language of proximate cause, the court holding that
"the original act of negligence ... is so inextricably woven with
the subsequent occurrences involved that it cannot be disas-
sociated from any of them. ' 73
Jesse D. McDonald
73. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513, 519 (La. App. 1948).
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